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JOHN E. DONALDSON 
Law Reform-Suggested Revisions to 
Virginia's Wills Statutes 
PART ONE 
T HE Executive Committee ofLhe Virginia Bar Asso-
ciation in 1975 requested the Committee on Wills, 
Trusts and Estates to undertake a study of substan-
tive law and procedure in Virginia relating to succes-
sion to property and the administration of estates. It 
was expected that the study would focus on the pro-
priety of Virginia's adopting the Uniform Probate 
Code. In 197H the Committee on Wills, Trusts and 
Estates determined that adoption of the U.P.C. as a 
whole was not warranted . It also determined to con· 
tinue its examination of the adequacy of Virginia law 
and procedure relating to matters covered by the 
U.P.C. with a view to making appropriaterecommen-
dations to the EXl'cutive Committee as needed revi-
sions were identified. The Committee's ongoing efforts 
in this regard have contrihuted importantly to the 
enactment of recent legislation involving such mat-
ters as the inheritance rights of children, multiple 
party accounts, family support allowances and exemp-
tions and the disposition of community property. 
The Committee now has under consideration a 
number of proposed statutory changes pertaining to 
the execution, interpretation, construction and revo-
cation of wills. These proposals were developed hy a 
subcommittee which studied Virginia case and statu-
tory law in areas covered by Article 2, Parts i) through 
9, of the V.P.C. The Committee intends to complete its 
consideration of these proposals and make appro-
priate recommendations to the Executive Committee 
prior to the 1984 session of the General Assembly. 
This article, which is to be published in two parts, is 
intended to inform the bar of the proposed changes 
and to invite comments and suggestions. Tn the dis-
cussion that follows, the prImary focus is the ade-
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quacy of Virginia statutory law governing the devolu-
tion of a testator's estate where the testator has not 
expressed his intent sufficiently. The principal func· 
tion ofthe statutes examined is the implementation of 
the intent that the testator is presumed to have had in 
a number of different situations. These statutes thus 
reflect legislative guessing as to the probable desires 
of the "typical" testator in the situations addressed. 
A. D('at h of t h(' leRalee or d('lIisee prior to the 
death of the testator. 
J n well-drafted wills the circumstance of a named 
beneficiary predeceasing the testator is usually ad· 
dressed by conditioning the bequest or devise upon 
the legatee surviving the testator. Often an alternate 
taker is designated. Where a will fails to address the 
circumstance of a legatee predeceasing the testator, 
the legacy, upon such occurrence and absent a stat· 
ute, lapses or fails, thus falling into the residue or 
passing by intestacy. Statutes, commonly referred to 
as "anti-lapse" statutes, have been enacted in most 
states to "save" the legacy to a predeceasing legatee. 
This is typically accomplished by providing that the 
legacy is to pass to the issue of the deceased legatee. 
The Virginia anti-lapse st.atute, § 64.1-64, is defi· 
cient in several respects, especially given that the 
purpose of an anti-lapse statute is to implement the 
presumed intent of a te::;tator where a devisee or lega· 
tee predeceases the testator. First, the Virginia statute 
is deficient in providi ng anti·lapse protection as to all 
devisees and legatees who predecease the testator and 
leave issue who survive the testator. In the case of a 
testator who has children by a prior marriage and a 
second spouse who also has children by a prior mar· 
riage, a legacy to the spouse, not conditioned on sur· 
vivorship, would, where the spouse predeceases the 
testator, pass to the issue of the deceased spouse 
under the Virginia statute, to the exclusion of the 
testator's own issue by his prior marriage. Presuma· 
bly, the testator would have preferred the bequest to 
pass to his issue (through intestacy or perhaps under 
a residuary clause) rather than to the issue of his 
spouse. 
Second, under tlw Virginia statute a hequest to an 
unrelated legatee \>vho predeceases the testator sur-
vived hy descendants may pass to such person's de-
scendants. It is, of COllrse, difLicult to estimate the 
course of succession that a testator may have pre-
ferred when' an unrelated legatee prl'deceases him. 
Most states that have addressed the issue have pre-
sumed that the te::;tator would not have preferred to 
"save" a kgacy to a predeceasing unrelated legatee 
and in effect provide that such a legac~1 falls into the 
residup or pass('s b.v intestacy. In a 1 !el(iO survey (see 
46 U. \ '(1 . I,. NI't' . H99), it was detl'rmined that ;37 
states requirpd the predpceasing legatpp to have he en 
related to t1w testator hefore their anti-lapse statutes 
became applicable and that only nin(' state::;, includ-
ing Virginia, had statute::; that were applicable in the 
ca::;c of predeceasing unrelated legatees. Alsl), given 
that where a legatee i::; related to thl' testator family 
tie::; and family interests are likely to be the motivat-
ing forces underlyi ng the legacy, the application of an 
anti -lapse statute where the legatee predeceases the 
decedent has the effect of preventing a "branch" of 
the family frum heing penalized solely because of the 
death of a member (usually the "Iwad") of the branch. 
In this regard, thp anti-lapse statute functions in 
much the way that the statute of intestate succession 
functions wlwn an heir apparent dies leaving issue 
surviving. llowewr, tIll' motiv(' of friendship which 
presumably underlies most lpgacies to non-relatives i::; 
less likely to he coupled with "family" considerations 
of the kind that undprlie legacips to relatives and the 
testator is less likply to he concprt1ed ahout protecting 
the "family" of an intpnded unrelatpd legatee from 
the untimely death uf such intended legatee. Although 
not frpe of doubt, it is submitted that the majority 
approach, which is also reflected in U.P.C. § 2-(:;0,\ 
best approximates the presumed intent of a testator in 
requiring that the pn·deceasecl legatpe be related in 
a particular degree to the testator before an anti-lapse 
statute will be applicable. In this regard, the approach 
of the U.P.C. in defining relatedness in terms of de-
scent from a grandparent, while arhitrary, is nonethe-
less reasonahle in that it emhracps kindred through 
first cousins, including first ('ousins severn I times 
removpd, but f'xcludps tl1f' more distant relatives who 
are lpss likPly to have genuine "family" Donds with 
the decedent. 
Another dpjicipncy in the anti-lapse statute, ~ G4.1-
l14, arises from a 1 ~l~O anwndment that sought to 
appl~' the statute to testamentary pourovprs to trusts 
having- rt'nmindernll'n who predecPClspd the testator. 
This problem will be addressed in the second install-
ment of this artidt'. 
A minor ddiC'ienc~' in the statuti> lies in its structure 
I- - -I 
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and relationship to other rl'ievani provisions. The last 
sentpnce of S 64.1-fl4, in trpating thp circulllstances IIf 
tlw ocath of 0111' of several n>siduary legatpps without 
issue surviving, more appropriately hplongs in ~ 64.1-
6;3, which is discussed helow. 
Set forth in the ApPf'ndix are proposals (1) and (2) 
which would impleml'nt thesl' recommendations by 
appropriate amendmen ts to ~ G4.1-fj ·l alld ~ G4 .1-1l!1. 
R. Fui/ure of testomentor)' provisions. 
Minor changes in statutory law are needed to better 
provide for the disposition of bequests and devises 
that are not saved by the anti-lapse statute. For 
example, what hecomes of a legacy or devise to a 
beneficiary who predeceased the testator without 
issue surviving,! In suhstance, Virginia law closely 
parallels U.p.('. ~ 2-1101l. Both treat lapsed legacies as 
falling into the residul'. Also, hoth treat residuary 
legacies to two or more persons as not subject to par-
tial failure by reuson of the death of one legatee v·lit.h-
out issue surviving'. Such a death is treated as 
pnlarging the shares of the other residuary le!':utees 
rather than resulting in partial intestacy. 
The Virginia statutes setting forth this treatment, 
which is helieved sound, are ~ 64.1·61 (last sentence) 
and ~ 61.1·65. As has heen noted above, the last sent-
ence of~ 64.1-61 more appropriately belongs in § 64.1 · 
(;S. That latter section, in its present format, is 
misleading in thai it addresses only the question of 
the d isposi iion of lapsed devises and leaves the 
ancient principles of the common law to furnish the 
rule that fuiled legacies fall into the residue. Tn the 
interpsts of darity, the treatment of failed legacips 
should also he addressed in the statute. 
Proposal (2), set forth in the Appendix, presents 
dmft legislation which, if adopted, would implement 
these re{'omm('ndations. 
C. Heuil'a/ o( (orm('r lrills; ('(frct of rf'l'o('ulion 
of later ll'ill. 
An issue on which American jurisdictions are 
widely divided involves the question of the proper 
treatment of an parlier will where a tpstator executes 
a later will which purports to revoke the former, and 
t11(~ later wi II is i tsel f revoked. [n such ci rcumstances 
dops the former will thereby hccome operative at 
death'! Three basic approaches have heen followed. A 
large numlwr of jurisdictions, including those which 
have adopted the UP.c., apply various rebuttable 
presumptions as to whether the decedent intended the 
former will to be operative upon the revocation of the 
lat.er and permit extrinsic evidence t.o establish intent. 
This approach has been criticized by commentators 
as violative of the spirit of wiUs acts in inviting the 
use ufparul evidence to establish testamentary intent 
A small number of jurisdictions follow a second 
approach which is sometimes referred to as the com· 
mon law rule of "automatic revivaL" This approach, 
which is rather mechanistic, is based un the principle 
that a will does not "speak" until death and a later 
will which purports to revoke an eariiN will has no 
l"ffeci on the earlier will if it, thl~ later will , is revoked. 
Th us the f(~vo('ation of a revoki ng \vill pn'ven ts the 
revoking will from speaking language of revocation 
and as a C'onseq uence the l'arliL'r will is not revoked. 
This "automatic revival" approach has tlw advan· 
t.age of ccrt.ainty , but it is questionable \,>'hether it 
accuratel.y reflects the testamentary' wishes of the 
decedents i nvnl ved. 
A third approach ohsprvcd in a number of jurisdic-
tions approximates that employed in Section :2:2 oftlw 
English \".li1ls Act of 1 H:l7. Un Lipr that Act. there is no 
revival of an earlier will hy reusnn of the revocation of 
a later will and revival occurs only by the reexl'cution 
of the earlier will or by a codiril expressing an intent 
to revive the parlier. The purpnse uf the Ad was to 
reverse by statute the "common 1m"," rule that 
resulted in automatic revival ofthe first will upon the 
revocation of the second. Since only a "revoked" will 
can he "revived," the Act presumes that the revoca· 
tion of the first will occurs at the timp of execution of 
the second, which revokes tlw first expressly or by 
implication, and not when t.he spcond will "speaks" at 
the dl-'ath of the decedent. That under the Act the 
sccond will revokes the first will at the time of execu· 
tion of the second will was ('on firmed hy the English 
j udici nry in I H4:j in Major v. \-\lilliam8.:1 Curl. '\:12, 163 
Eng. Rep. 781. The English upproach thus employs 
the concept of automatic non·revival of a first will 
upon the revocation of the second and has the virtue 
of eliminating resort to parol or extrinsic evidence. 
For a listing of the states that fall into each of the 
three main groupings of American responses to the 
revival issue, see the Commen'. 4~J Denver 1.. ,I. 593 
(197::l). 
The current condition of Virginia law with respect 
to this issue is derived from strained and convoluted 
statutory interpretation and is much in need of revi· 
sion. The applicah1p Virginia statutes appear to place 
Virginia in the third grouping of states, those which 
follow th!' I';nglish Wills Act of 1 H:17 and its rule of 
"automatic non·revivaL" Tlowpver, thp Virginia Suo 
preme Court, by construction, has placpd the state in 
t.he second grouping, \vhich follows the rule of "auto· 
matic revivaL" How this came about is most unusual. 
Hoth the Virginia rpvl)cat.ion statutl', ~ (-i4. I .;)1-\ , and 
the Virginia revival statute, ~ 6·1.1·(){), an~, in all rna· 
terial respects, identical to counterpart provisions of 
the English \Vills Act of U~:17, both being lirst adopted 
in this Stutl' in I fl4!). Thf' H('porl of th(' Hf'l ,i,wlrs o( the 
('it'll ('ode oj" VirRinia (1 H'H)) states at pagp 62;3: 
The late F:nglish statute of wills ... intro· 
duced some'''valuahle improvements .... \Ve 
have adopted nearly t.he whole of the st.atute, 
for double reasons that Wl' approve its provi· 
siems, and that tlw adoption hen' of thost' 
provisions "\vi II givt' us tilt' IlPnpfit of the Eng· 
lish decisions upon them ... 
Presumahly, the codl' revisors in lH,'\9 were aware 
that the English judiciary had, in I Hcl:l, construL'd the 
English \Vills Ad in the ma!1lwr indicated above, and 
that under that Act the execution of a spcond will 
revoking the first is the event at which revocation of 
tllt' first. occurs. Presumably, tlw revisors were also 
awarp that till' purpose of till' Act was to n'Vl'rSL' the 
common Im.v rulp that a s!'cond rt'voking will, if itself 
revoked, ncver "spcaks" to revoke th e first will. 
The Virginia legislation of 1 H49 was not construed 
untill ~77 , wlwre in Hu(l/sillv . Rhude::; , 70 Va. In, the 
court, expressly relying on English precedent, Major 
v. Ifilliam,'; , supra, held, in aCnJrdanre with legisla-
tive history and purpose, that tlw rpvocation of a 
second will does not operate to ]'('vive a first will. 
None of the twelve staU's which deri ve their law from 
the English Wills Act have held otherwise in cases 
where the second wi II ex pres ~.;ly l'I'vokps the first. 1\ or 
is any distinction usu a lly drawn in these states 
between second \vills whirh revoke the lirst f'xpressly. 
and those which l'l· voke the first b.v implication 
through inconsistpIH'.v. Set' I'age O il IVills (Rowe-
Parker Revision, I 96()), Vol. 2, p. ,1·H. 
Although Virginia . hy statute, appears aligned 
with t he "cone! usi VP I))'PSU m pI ion of non-revival " 
position of the English Wills Act of 1H:n, the align-
ment changed in I ~J :lH . [n P()indexter v. JOlles, 200 Va. 
372, lOG S.E. 2d 1,14 (1 ~):lH), t.he court distinguished 
between second wills rpvokinj..( the first b:v express 
revocation clausl' and second wills revoking the ear-
lier by implicat.ion arising from inconsistenl';,)' , hold-
ing, as to t1w latter, that a destruction of a secund will 
merely incollsistent with the first, and not expressly 
revoking it, does rlilt in fact revoke tlw first, because 
the inconsistpllt. lallj..(uaj..(l' IH~v('r "speaks" in that cir-
cumstance . Thl' holding oftlw ('ourt, while perhaps at 
odds with t1w lej..(islative history, has some logic in 
that th e laity probably n~gard language of express 
revocation to be immediately effective and could 
regard bnj..(\wge of inconsistpnr,'.' to he ambulatory . 
See Pa~I ' ()II tl'il/s, supra, at pagl' 4,1:1. 
The rptrpat from the estahlished interpretation of 
the Virginia rpvival stat.ute which began with Poin · 
dexter became an abnndonment. of I. hat interpretation 
in 1'imlwrlah' (' v. Staf l' Planters Hanh, :201 Va. 9GO, 11;') 
S.E . 2d :l9 ( 19fiO). There the court, as to a second will 
which pxprpssly revoked a first will, and which 
second will. Iwc<1use not found, was pn~sumed revoked 
by physical a ct, held that tlw second will did not 
"speak" at death to n' voke the first. In short, the court 
held that until a will is revoked it continues in pHect 
and it spcond will never revokes a first will if the 
second will is it:·.;plf revoked. 
As an pxprcisp in statutory' intprpretation, the 
majority opinion in Timb('rlaN(, is faulty for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
1. Linder t1w opinion, ~ fi4.I -fiO is virtually ml'an -
ingless as a "revival" statute. In treating a first will 
as unrevoked by the express language of a second will 
until the second will speaks at death, which it cannot 
do if the sel'ond will is revoked, the revocation of a 
second will can never present. a revival issue IwcausI' 
the first will, being unrevoked, is not in Iwed of revi -
val. The court's attempt to find meaning in ~ £:i4.HiO 
by attempting to distinguish between "declaratory" 
revocations and "testamentary" revocations is spe-
cious, and based on a casf' , Rarhsda/e v. Harhsdalc, :19 
Va. Cl:lil (1.'\42), decided seven years heforp Virginia 
adopted the predecessor provisions to ~ h'1.1-;'}.'\ and 
S 64.1-60. 
2. The opinion overrules the previous statutor.',. 
interpretation expressed in Rudisill v . Rhodes, supra, 
by ignoring the English authority upon which that 
case was decided. 
:.\. The opinion results in an interpretation that is 
diametrically opposed to thp purposp and intent of 
S h4. L-oO as first enacted, which was to rl'VI'rse the 
"common law" rule that a second will never revokes a 
first will unless the second will "speaks" at death. 
Kather than reading- ~ h1.1-60 to reverse the "com· 
mon law" rule, the opinion, apparentl.v ohlivious to 
the fact that ~ 6'1.1-i'>F; also was dprived from the Eng· 
lish \Vills Act of 1.'\:17, construes ~ 0,1.1 ·,,).'\ in conjunc' 
tion with ~ fi4.1-60 to restore the common law rule 
that the statutes were intended to reverse. 
The immediate task of determining the adequacy of 
Virginia law in contrast to the approach suggested in 
the LJ.P.c. thus results in thL' comparison of an emas-
culated, largely meaningless ~ fi·1.1 -hO with U.P.c. 
S 2·!)09. The u.P.C., in inviting- the use of parol evi-
dence to resolve the question of whether revival of t.he 
earlier instrument was intended by the testator upon 
till' revocation of a later wilL introduces uncertainty 
t.o probate proceedings and invites the use of a kind of 
evidence that is traditionally regarded as unreliahk. 
The Virginia "common law" approach required under 
the holding in Timher/ahl' probahly ddeats the 
wishes of most testators who, having rf'voked a first 
will expressly hy the terms of a spcond, revoke the 
second, perhaps in the hope oflater executing a third . 
To suppose that a decedent, having once expressly 
repudiated a testamentary plan, would prefer that 
plan to intestacy upon thf' revocation of a later will is 
unrpalistic , notwithstanding legalistic implications 
arising from the ambulatory character of wills. The 
"common law" position, concededly, does have the 
virtue, however, of makinj..( unnecessary inquiry into 
the question of whether a later will may have been 
executed and revoked. 
Although, given t.he diven;ity of rpspectahle opin -
ion, the matter is not free of doubt, the approach to 
" revival" reflected in the English Wills Act of IR:l7, 
with slight modification, is believed preferable. Ac-
cordingl,'.', it is submitted that the propf'r response to 
7 
the "revival" issue requires a statutory solution 
reflective of the following principles: 
1. That revival of a former will by reason of the 
revocation of a later will sbould occur only when the 
decedent would probably have so intended, and that 
resort to parol evidence to determine such intention is 
Lmproper. 
2. That when a second will expressly revokes a first 
will it is presumed to bc the intention of the decedent 
that revocation occurs upon the execution of the 
second will and the latcr rcvocation of the second will 
does not make the first operative. 
:1. That where a later will does not expressly revoke 
a former will, but is merely inconsistent with it in 
whole or in part, the mere execution of the later will 
does not, of itself, operate to revoke the former , and 
if the later will is itself revoked, the vitality of the 
earlier will continues unaffected by the provisions of 
the later will. It is thus presumed, in such cases, that 
an earlier will, not expressly revoked, remains viable 
as a testamentary document until superseded by a 
document admissible to probate upon the death of the 
decedent, and not revoked prior to death. Fortunately, 
eases involvin!l; the application of this principlc do 
not arise often, and generally involve holographic 
writings as in Poindexter v. ,Janet;. supra. 
4. A will may be revived by a duly executed later 
writing expressing an intention to do so. 
These principles generally reflect the observations 
set forth in Paw' 011 Wills. supra Vol. 2, p. 44:1, as 
follows: 
Most of the laity apparently believe that 
the express revocation clause revokes the 
first will at once, and the rule that the revo-
cation of the second will automatically leaves 
the first will in effect, frequently results in 
gi ving effect to a testamentary disposition 
whieh the testator had long since forgotten , 
Hnd which, if he had remembered it. he 
would have thought had no legal effect. 
The courts which distinguish between the 
cases in which the later will has an express 
revocation clause and those in which it is 
merely incunsistent with the prior will, 
probably come nearer to the intention of the 
greater number of testators. 
Legislative proposals (;~) and (-1), which amend 
~ fl4.1-5H and ~ fl4.1·flO, are set forth in the Appendix 
and would, if enacted. i mplemen t these recommended 
changes. 
The Committee on Wills, Trusts and Estates, in 
considering- these recommended revisions, and those 
which will be diseussed in the second installment of 
this article, is mindful that succession statutes oflong 
H 
standing which are familiar and have well defined 
meanings thruugh judicial interpretation are valua· 
ble to the pu blic and the bar because of the element of 
certainty they afford. However, statutes that furnish 
rules of construction designed to approximate the 
intent of testators whose actual intent is unexpressed 
are especially deserving of periodic review, for what 
may appropriately have been the presumed intent of 
a typical testator in a generation past is not necessar· 
ily a measure of such intent today. 
Appendix 
Propusal!. It is proposed that ~ 6>1.1-64 be amended 
and reenacted to read as follows: 
S 64.1-64. When children or descendan ts of devi-
see, legatee, etc. to take estate.-lJnless a contrary 
inten tion shall appear in the will, if a devisee or 
legatee who is a grandparent or a lineal descend· 
ant of a /.,rrandparent of the testator is dead at the 
time of execution of the will or fails to survive the 
testator, the issue of the deceased devisee or legatee 
who survive the testator take in the place of the 
deceased devisee or legatee and ifthey are all ofthe 
same degree of kinship to such deceased devisee or 
legatee they take equally, but if of unequal degree 
then those of more remote degree take by represen-
tation. One who would have been a devisee or lega-
tee under a dass gift ifhe had survived the testator 
is treated as a devisee or legatee for purposes of this 
section whether his death occurred before or after 
the exeeution of the will. 
Prupusa12. It is proposed that § 64.1-65 be amended 
and reenacted to read as follows: 
§ 64. I-oil. How devises and bequests that fail, 
etc. to pass.-lJnless a contrary intention shall 
appear by the will, and except as provided in § 64.1-
64, if a devise or bequest other than a residuary 
devise or bequest fails for any reason, it hecomes a 
part of the residue, and if the residue is devised or 
bequeathed to two or more persons and the share of 
one fails for an;' reason, such share shall pass to 
the other residuary devisee or legatee or devisees or 
legatees in proportion to their interests in the 
residue. 
Proposal 3. It is proposed that. § 64.1-58 be amended 
and reenacted to read as follows: 
~ 64.1-58. Revocation of wills generally-
(a) If a testator having an intent to revoke, or 
som(~ person at his direction and in his presence 
cuts, tears, hurns, obliterates, cancels or destroys a 
will or codicil, or the signature thereto, or some 
(COlli illlWd Oil pa#., 2H! 
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(continued from page 8) 
provision thereof, such will, codicil or prOVISIOn 
thereof is thereby void and of no effect. 
(b) If a testator executes a will or other writing in 
the manner in which a will is required to be exe-
cuted, and such will or other writing expressly 
revokes a previous will, such previous will, includ-
ing any codicil thereto, is thereby void and of no 
effect. 
(c) If a testator duly executes a will or codicil 
which does not expressly revoke a former will, but 
which expressly revokes a part thereof, or contains 
28 
provisions inconsistent therewith, such former will 
is revoked and superseded to the extent of such 
express revocation or inconsistency if the later will 
becomes effectual upon the death of the testator. 
Proposal 4. It is proposed that § 64.1-60 be amended 
and reenacted to read as follows: 
§ 64.1-60. Revival of wills.-No will or codicil, or 
any part thereof which shall have become void and 
of no effect under the provisions of § 64.1-58 shall 
thereafter become operative otherwise than by the 
reexecution thereof, or by a codicil executed in the 
manner hereinbefore required, and then only to the 
extent to which an intention to revive the same is 
shown. 
